Disruption of NPI Licensing: The Case of Presuppositions*

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Introduction

0.1 The observation

- Presuppositions disrupt NPI licensing.

    ○ In French and Italian, an NPI in the complement clause of a cognitive factive predicate is not licensed:

(1)   (*Context:* Marie is the best player in the tournament.)

    a. *Jean <u>ne</u> ***sait*** <u>pas</u> que Marie a   **la moindre** chance
        Jean NEG knows NEG that Marie have.IND the slightest chance
        de gagner.   (*French*)
        to win.
        'Jean doesn't know that Marie has any chance to win.'

    b. *Presupposition:* Marie has some chance to win.

(2)   a. Jean <u>ne</u> pense <u>pas</u> que Marie a/ait   **la moindre**
        Jean NEG thinks NEG that Marie have.IND/SUBJ the slightest
        chance de gagner.   (*French*)
        chance to win.
        'Jean doesn't think that Marie has any chance to win.'

    b. *Presupposition:* None.

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0.2   Goals

- <u>My goals:</u>

    (i.) Show that the notion of meaning that is relevant for NPI licensing includes presuppositions.

    (ii.) Draw a parallel with another type of intervening inferences, i.e. scalar implicatures.

0.3   Plan

I. Scalar implicatures and the interventions they create

II. Presuppositions must be included in the meaning that is relevant for NPI licensing

III. Argue against Strawson-Entailment

1   Intervention by Implicatures

1.1   Downward-Entailment

- Fauconnier-Ladusaw: An NPI requires to be in the scope of a downward-entailing function.

(3)   Downward Entailingness: A function f of type $<\sigma, t>$ is DE iff for all x, y of type σ such that $x \Rightarrow y : f(y) \Rightarrow f(x)$

- DE functions: *no, not, doubt, without, 'less than three students', 'few students', antecedents of conditionals, questions, restrictors of universal quantifiers...*

1.2   Intervention

- Intervention at LF caused by *and, every, always, because*-clauses (facts known at least since Linebarger 1981).

(4)   a.   I doubt that every housemate of Sue has potatoes.
        b.   *I <u>doubt</u> that ***every*** housemate of Sue has **any** potatoes.
        c.   *<u>Doubt</u> ... ***every*** ... **NPI**.

(5)   a.   I didn't drink a cocktail and a soda.
        b.   *I did<u>n't</u> drink a cocktail ***and*** **any** soda.
        c.   *<u>Not</u> ... ***and*** ... **NPI**.

1.3   Chierchia (2004)

- According to Chierchia (2004), the interveners form a natural class: they are all **strong scalar terms.** Ex.: <every, most, some>, <and, or>.

- Grammar provides **two** meanings: plain and strong.

- The notion of meaning which is relevant for NPI licensing is the notion of **strong meaning:** the strong meaning of sentence ϕ noted $[\![\phi]\!]^s$ is the **conjunction** of the **plain meaning** (truth conditions) of ϕ and its **implicatures.**

- Indirect implicatures triggered by a DE function like *not* outscoping a strong scalar term disrupt NPI licensing.

(6)   *It is <u>not</u> the case that ***everybody*** has **any** roses.

(7)   a.   It is not the case that everybody has **roses.**   *Scalar Implicature:* Somebody has roses.
       b.   It is not the case that everybody has **blue roses.** *Scalar Implicature:* Somebody has blue roses.

(8) $[\![(7\text{-a})]\!]^s = \neg[\forall x \text{ some}_D\text{'(roses')}(\lambda y.\ x \text{ has } y)] \wedge \exists x \text{ some}_D\text{'(roses')}(\lambda y.\ x \text{ has } y)$

(9) $[\![(7\text{-b})]\!]^s = \neg[\forall x \text{ some}_D\text{'(blue roses')}(\lambda y.\ x \text{ has } y)] \wedge \exists x \text{ some}_D\text{'(blue roses')}(\lambda y.\ x \text{ has } y)$

$$[\![(7\text{-a})]\!]^s \not\Rightarrow [\![(7\text{-b})]\!]^s$$

1.3.1   Identity between the trigger and the licenser

- An intriguing case of **non-intervention** (NPI licenser and Implicature trigger are identical):

(10)   a.   ***Fewer than three students*** have read **anything.**
       b.   *Direct Implicature:* At least one student has read something.
             | No Intervention |

1.3.2   Where we are

I. Scalar implicatures and the interventions they create

II. **Presuppositions must be included in the meaning that is relevant for NPI licensing**

III. Argue against Strawson-Entailment

2   Presuppositions

2.1   Too and either

2.1.1   Too intervenes

(11)   a.   (*Context:*   Mary   read   something   interesting.)
              *I do<u>n't</u> think [John]$_F$ read **anything** interesting ***too***.
       b.   *Presupposition:* Somebody other than John read something inter-
              esting.

(12)   I don't think [John]$_F$ read something interesting too.

2.1.2   Either doesn't intervene

(13)   a.   (*Context:*   Mary   didn't   read   anything   interesting.)
              I do<u>n't</u> think [John]$_F$ read **anything** interesting ***either***.
       b.   *Presupposition:* Somebody other than John did**n't** read anything
              interesting.

2.2 μ meaning

- **Hypothesis:** Presupposition triggers intervene and the presupposition itself
  must be taken into account.

- Let's define the operator μ, which takes a trivalent meaning and returns a
  bivalent meaning:

(14)   Let F be a sentence. $\mu(\llbracket F \rrbracket) = 0$ iff $\llbracket F \rrbracket = \#$ or 0 and $\mu(\llbracket F \rrbracket) = 1$ iff $\llbracket F \rrbracket =$
       1.

- The notion of meaning of *F* that is relevant for NPI licensing is the μ mean-
  ing, i.e. the ***conjunction*** of the ***assertive content*** and the ***presuppositions***
  of F.

(15)   *I do<u>n't</u> think [John]$_F$ read **anything** interesting ***too.***

(16)   a.   I don't think John read **a book** too. *Presupposition:* Somebody
              other than John read a book.
       b.   I don't think John read **a novel** too. *Presupposition:* Somebody
              other than John read a novel.

(17) $\mu(\llbracket (16\text{-a}) \rrbracket) = \exists x [x \neq j \wedge (\text{a book})'[\lambda y.x \text{ read } y]] \wedge \neg((\text{a book})'(\lambda y. j \text{ read } y))$

(18) $\mu(\llbracket (16\text{-b}) \rrbracket) = \exists x [x \neq j \wedge (\text{a novel})'[\lambda y.x \text{ read } y]] \wedge \neg((\text{a novel})'(\lambda y. j \text{ read } y))$

$$\mu(\llbracket (16\text{-a}) \rrbracket) \not\Rightarrow \mu(\llbracket (16\text{-b}) \rrbracket)$$

(19) I do<u>n't</u> think [John]$_F$ read **anything** interesting *either.*

(20) a. I don't think John read **a book** either. *Presupposition:* Somebody other than John didn't read a book.
      b. I don't think John read **a novel** either. *Presupposition:* Somebody other than John didn't read a novel.

(21) $\mu(\llbracket (20\text{-a})\rrbracket)=\exists x\ [x{\neq}j \wedge \neg((\text{a book})'[\lambda y.x \text{ read } y])] \wedge \neg((\text{a book})'(\lambda y.\ j \text{ read } y))$

(22) $\mu(\llbracket (20\text{-b})\rrbracket)=\exists x\ [x{\neq}j \wedge \neg((\text{a novel})'[\lambda y.x \text{ read } y])] \wedge \neg((\text{a novel})'(\lambda y.\ j \text{ read } y))$

$$\mu(\llbracket (20\text{-a})\rrbracket) \Rightarrow \mu(\llbracket (20\text{-b})\rrbracket)$$

2.3 More data

2.3.1 French and Italian cognitive factives

(*Context:* Marie has some chance to win.)

(23) a. *Jean <u>ne</u> *sait* <u>pas</u> que Marie a **la moindre** chance de
          Jean NEG knows NEG that Marie has the slightest chance to
          gagner. (*French*)
          win.
          'Jean doesn't know that Marie has any chance to win.'
      b. *Presupposition:* Marie has some chance to win.

(24) *Jean does<u>n't</u> ***know*** that Mary has **any** chance to win.

(25) a. Jean doesn't know that Marie read **a book.** *Presupposition:* Marie read a book.
      b. John doesn't know that Marie read **a novel.** *Presupposition:* Mary read a novel.

(26) $\mu(\llbracket (25\text{-a})\rrbracket) = [(\text{a book})'[\lambda y.\ m \text{ read } y]] \wedge \neg(\text{believe}')[(\text{a book})'(\lambda y.\ m \text{ read } y)](j)$

(27) $\mu(\llbracket (25\text{-b})\rrbracket) = [(\text{a novel})'[\lambda y.\ m \text{ read } y]] \wedge \neg(\text{believe}')[(\text{a novel})'(\lambda y.\ m \text{ read } y)](j)$

$$\mu(\llbracket (25\text{-a})\rrbracket) \not\Rightarrow \mu(\llbracket (25\text{-b})\rrbracket)$$

2.3.2 Italian indicative

(*Context:* Maria has been to Paris several times.)

(28) a. *Gianni <u>non</u> pensa che Maria *è* **mai** andata a
          Gianni NEG think that Maria be.IND ever gone to
          Parigi.
          Paris. (*Italian*)
          'Gianni doesn't think that Maria ever went to Paris.'

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b. *Presupposition:* Maria has been to Paris.

(29) a. Gianni <u>non</u> pensa che Maria *sia*   **mai** andata a Parigi.
Gianni NEG think that Maria be.SUBJ ever gone   to Paris.
'Gianni doesn't think that Maria ever went to Paris.'
b. *Presupposition:* None.

2.3.3 Pourquoi/Comment (Why/How)

(*Context:* Marie wrote something to her mother.)

(30)   a. ***Pourquoi/Comment** Marie a-t- elle écrit   **quoi**   **que ce soit** à
Why/How   Marie has she written anything   to
sa mère ?   *(French)*
her mother?
'Why/How has Marie written anything to her mother?'
b. *Presupposition:* Marie wrote something to her mother.

(31)   a. Pourquoi/Comment Marie écrirait-   elle **quoi**   **que ce soit**
Why/How   Marie would-write she anything
à sa mère ?   *(French)*
to her mother?
'Why/How would Marie write anything to her mother?'
b. *Presupposition:* None.

2.3.4 Singular definite descriptions

(32)   (*Context:* Two men are flirting with Mary; one is very generous, the
other is not.)
a. *I do<u>n't</u> like *the* man who offered Mary **anything.**
b. *Presupposition:* There is exactly one man who offered Mary some-
thing.

(33)   a. I do<u>n't</u> like *the* man (if there is such a man) who offered Mary
anything.
b. *Presupposition:* None.

2.3.5 Both

(34)   a. <u>*Every*</u> student who knows **any** linguistics has applied to the depart-
ment.
b. *Presupposition:* None (see Appendix).

(35)   (*Context:* Exactly two students know some linguistics.)
a. *<u>*Both*</u> students who know **any** linguistics have applied to the depart-
ment.
b. *Presupposition:* There are exactly two students who know some
linguistics.

2.3.6 Because

(36)   a.   (*Context:* Peter broke your vase.) *You're <u>not</u> mad at Peter ***because*** he broke **anything,** but because he won't own up to it.

    b.   *Presupposition:* Peter broke something.

(37)   a.   You're <u>not</u> mad at Peter ***because*** he broke **anything** (of course, he would never do such a thing), but because he says you're on the chubby side.

    b.   *Presupposition:* None.

2.3.7 Where we are

I. Scalar implicatures and the interventions they create

II. Presuppositions must be included in the meaning that is relevant for NPI licensing

III. **Argue against Strawson-Entailment**

3 Against Strawson-Entailment

3.1 An exception: Be sorry

(38)   John is ***<u>sorry</u>*** that Mary bought **any** car.

(39)   a.   John is sorry that Mary bought **a car.** *Presupposition:* Mary bought a car.

    b.   John is sorry that Mary bought **a Honda.** *Presupposition:* Mary bought a Honda.

(40) $\mu(\llbracket(39\text{-}a)\rrbracket) = [(a\ car)'[\lambda y.\ m\ \text{bought}\ y]] \wedge (be\text{-}sorry')[(a\ car)'(\lambda y.\ m\ \text{bought}\ y)](j)$

(41) $\mu(\llbracket(39\text{-}b)\rrbracket) = [(a\ Honda)'[\lambda y.\ m\ \text{bought}\ y]] \wedge (be\text{-}sorry')[(a\ Honda)'(\lambda y.\ m\ \text{bought}\ y)](j)$

$$\mu(\llbracket(39\text{-}a)\rrbracket) \nRightarrow \mu(\llbracket(39\text{-}b)\rrbracket)$$

3.2 Strawson-Entailment (von Fintel)

(42)   Strawson-Entailment: Φ Strawson-entails Ψ if and only if, assuming that the presuppositions of Ψ are satisfied, whenever Φ is true, Ψ is true.

(43)   Strawson Downward-Entailingness: A function f of type $<\sigma,t>$ is Strawson-DE iff for all x, y of type σ such that $x \Rightarrow y$ and $f(x)$ is defined: $f(y) \Rightarrow f(x)$

- *Only* and emotive factives like *regret* and *be surprised* are captured by von Fintel's S-DEness.

(44)   John is ***sorry*** that Mary bought **any** car.

(45)   a.   John is sorry that Mary bought **a car.** *Presupposition:* Mary bought a car.
         b.   John is sorry that Mary bought **a Honda.** *Presupposition:* Mary bought a Honda.

(46) $\mu(\llbracket(45\text{-a})\rrbracket) = [(\text{a car})'[\lambda y.\ m \text{ bought } y]] \wedge (\text{be-sorry}')[(\text{a car})'(\lambda y.\ m \text{ bought } y)](j)$

(47) $\mu(\llbracket(45\text{-b})\rrbracket) = [(\text{a Honda})'[\lambda y.\ m \text{ bought } y]] \wedge (\text{be-sorry}')[(\text{a Honda})'(\lambda y.\ m \text{ bought } y)](j)$

$$\mu(\llbracket(45\text{-a})\rrbracket) \not\Rightarrow \mu(\llbracket(45\text{-b})\rrbracket)$$

$$(45\text{-a}) \Rightarrow^{Strawson} (45\text{-b})$$

3.2.1   Strawson Upward-Entailment (Lahiri)

- Lahiri (1998): a (weak) NPI is only licensed in a SDE, non SUE environment.

(48)   Strawson Upward-Entailingness: A function f of type $<\sigma, t>$ is Strawson-UE iff for all *x, y* of type σ such that $x \Rightarrow y$ and $f(y)$ is defined: $f(x) \Rightarrow f(y)$

3.2.2   Singular definite descriptions

(49)   *___The___ student who read **any** books on NPIs passed the exam.

(50)   a.   The student who read **a book** passed the exam. *Presupposition:* There is a unique student who read a book.
         b.   The student who read **a novel** passed the exam.*Presupposition:* There is a unique student who read a novel.

$$(50\text{-a}) \Rightarrow^{Strawson} (50\text{-b}) \qquad (SDE)$$

$$(50\text{-b}) \Rightarrow^{Strawson} (50\text{-a}) \qquad (SUE)$$

$\mu(\llbracket(50\text{-a})\rrbracket) \not\Rightarrow \mu(\llbracket(50\text{-b})\rrbracket)$: (49) predicted **bad** by my theory

3.2.3   Other cases in favor of von Fintel/Lahiri

○ *Again*

(51)   (*Context:* Mary used to eat Chinese food until she became allergic to it.) I doubt that she will eat **any** Chinese food ***again.***

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○ *Even*

(52)   (*Context:* Peter is the best student in the class; the assignment was to read three books for today.)
I <u>doubt</u> that ***even*** Peter read **anything.**

○ Aspectual verbs

(53)   a.   John has<u>n't</u> ***stopped*** smoking **anything.**
b.   John has<u>n't</u> ***started*** smoking **anything.**

3.3   Beyond Strawson-Entailment

- von Fintel (1999): '... we need Strawson-Entailment, because presuppositions carried by the conclusion in downward inferences don't seem to disrupt NPI licensing.'

- This is not the case, as shown by the cases in favor of μ meanings:

○ *because*-clauses;

○ *too/either*;

○ Italian indicative;

○ French/Italian cognitive factives;

○ *pourquoi/comment*.

(54)   (*Context: Peter broke something.*)
*You're <u>not</u> mad at Peter ***because*** he broke **anything,** but because he won't own up to it.

(55)   a.   You're not mad at Peter because he broke **a vase.** *Presupposition:* Peter broke a vase.
b.   You're not mad at Peter because he broke **a blue vase.** *Presupposition:* Peter broke a blue vase.

(55-a) $\Rightarrow^{Strawson}$ (55-b)   *(SDE)* (55-b) $\not\Rightarrow^{Strawson}$ (55-a)   *(SUE)*

$\mu(\llbracket(55\text{-a})\rrbracket) \not\Rightarrow \mu(\llbracket(55\text{-b})\rrbracket)$: (54) predicted **bad** by my theory

3.3.1   Strong NPIs

○ English cognitive factive predicates

(56)   (*Context:* John slept a solid 10 hours last night.)
          *Mary does<u>n't</u> ***know*** that John **slept a wink.**

○ *Be sorry*

(57)   (*Context:* Betty's husband visited Mary three times over the past 10
          years.)
          *Betty is ***<u>sorry</u>*** that her husband visited Mary **in years.**

○ *Only*

(58)   (*Context:* John visited Mary three times over the past 10 years.)
   ***<u>Only</u>*** John visited Mary **in years.**

○ *Be surprised*

(59)   (*Context:* Mary exercised last year.)
          *I am ***<u>surprised</u>*** that Mary exercised **in years.**

3.3.2   Anti-Additivity

• Strong NPIs like *in years* or *yet* are not licensed by *be sorry*.

• According to Zwarts (1996), strong NPIs must be licensed by an ***Anti-Additive function*** (e.g. *'fewer than three students'* is not AA, but *'no student'* is):

(60)   Anti-Additivity: A function f is AA iff $(f(X) \wedge f(Y)) \iff f(X \vee Y)$
          (Zwarts 1996)

<table>
<tr><td align="center">Anti-Additive</td></tr>
<tr><td align="center">Downward-entailing
(i) $f(X) \vee f(Y) \Rightarrow f(X \wedge Y)$
(ii) $f(X \vee Y) \Rightarrow f(X) \wedge f(Y)$</td></tr>
<tr><td align="center">(iii) $f(X) \wedge f(Y) \Rightarrow f(X \vee Y)$</td></tr>
</table>

• *Be sorry* is not **Anti-Additive:**

(61)   a.   John is sorry that Mary is here and is sorry that Peter is here.
          b.   ⇒ John is sorry that Mary or Peter is here.

SORRY(X) $\wedge$ SORRY(Y) $\Rightarrow$ SORRY(X $\vee$ Y) (Left to Right)

(62) a. John is sorry that Mary or Peter is here.
      b. $\nRightarrow$ John is sorry that Mary is here and is sorry that Peter is here.

SORRY(X $\vee$ Y) $\nRightarrow$ SORRY(X) $\wedge$ SORRY(Y) (Right to Left)

- *Be sorry* is **Strawson Anti-Additive:**

(63) Strawson Anti-Additivity: A function f is Strawson Anti-Additive (SAA) iff (f(X) $\wedge$ f(Y)) and f(X $\vee$ Y) Strawson-entail each other.

(64) a. John is sorry that Mary is here and that Peter is here.
      b. $\Rightarrow^{Strawson}$ John is sorry that Mary or Peter is here.

SORRY(X) $\wedge$ SORRY(Y) $\Rightarrow^{Strawson}$ SORRY(X $\vee$ Y) (Left to Right)

(65) a. John is sorry that Mary or Peter is here.
      b. $\Rightarrow^{Strawson}$ John is sorry that Mary is here and is sorry that Peter is here.

SORRY(X $\vee$ Y) $\Rightarrow^{Strawson}$ SORRY(X) $\wedge$ SORRY(Y) (Right to Left)

- So the proponents of Strawson-entailment are led to say that strong NPIs must be licensed by strictly AA functions, not SAA functions (e.g. Gajewski 2005). **Therefore, Strawson-Entailment is only useful for weak NPIs.**

3.4   Dealing with some exceptions

- *Only* and emotive factives are also NPI licensers (this is reminiscent of (10-a) above, repeated as (66-a) below).

(66) a. *Fewer than three students* have read **anything.**
      b. *Only* John ate **anything** this morning.

(67) Generalization: If a presupposition trigger is also an NPI licenser, an NPI is allowed in its scope.

Conclusion

Outstanding problems

- English cognitive factive predicates don't block the licensing of weak NPIs;

- *Again, Even* and aspectual verbs do not intervene;

- *Both* doesn't fall under the generalization that licensers/triggers do not intervene.

Conclusion

- A number of intervention effects can only be captured if presuppositions are taken into account.

- The meaning that is relevant for NPI licensing is the conjunction of the assertive content and presuppositions.

How to account for exceptions?

- The exceptions (*again, even, aspectual verbs*) suggest a modular system: the presuppositions are not always accessible to the rest of the grammar.

- Or the notion of presupposition needs to be refined: the cause of the intervention is a *certain* type of presupposition.

REFERENCES

Chierchia, G. (2004), 'Scalar Implicatures, Polarity Phenomena, and the Syntax/Pragmatics Interface', in *Structures and Beyond,* A. Belletti (ed.), Oxford. Gajewski, J. (2005), 'Neg-Raising: Polarity and Presupposition', Dissertation, MIT. Lahiri, U. (1998), 'Focus and Negative Polarity in Hindi', *Natural Language Semantics* 6: 57-123. von Fintel, K. (1999), 'NPI Licensing, Strawson Entailment and Context Dependency', *Journal of Semantics* 16: 97-148. Zwarts, Frans (1996), 'Three Types of Polarity'. in *Plural Quantification,* ed. F. Hamm and E. Hinrichs, Kluwer: Dordrecht.

A   Interesting consequences

- Intervention data provide a way to tease apart local accommodation and non-projection on the one hand and non-triggering on the other.

A.1   Local Accommodation

Local accommodation: the intervention effect remains

(68)   The King of France is not bald, because there is no King of France.

(69)   (*Context:* Marie has some chance.)
        *Pierre <u>ne</u>   *s'aperçoit*   <u>pas</u> que Marie a   **la moindre** chance,
        Pierre NEG REFL-perceive NEG that Marie has the slightest chance,
        car elle n'   a   aucune chance.
        for she NEG has no   chance.
        'Pierre doesn't realize that Marie has any chance, for she has no chance.'

- Compare with the persistence of the intervention effect created by scalar implicatures when contextual knowledge defeats the implicature:

(70)   (*Context:* I think no student read any books, therefore...)
        *I <u>doubt</u> that *every student* read **anything.**

A.2   Non-projection

Non-projection of the presupposition: the intervention effect remains

- The presupposition of the second conjunct is satisfied by the first conjunct:

(71)   *I doubt that Peter went to Paris and that [Mary]$_F$ too ever went to Paris.

A.3   Non-triggering

Non-triggering: no intervention effect

(72)   <u>Si</u> Pierre ***s'apercevait*** que Marie ait   changé **quoi**   **que ce**
         If Pierre discovered   that Marie have.SUBJ changed anything
         soit, il serait   en colère.
         ,   he would-be in wrath.
         'If Pierre found out that Marie changed anything, he would be mad.'

- Compare with the lack of intervention when 11 is the weakest element of a truncated scale <..., 33, 22, 11>:

(73)   (A soccer coach can say...)
         I <u>never</u> had ***eleven*** kids who won **any** championship.

(74)   *I did<u>n't</u> meet ***eleven*** people who read **any** of my poetry.

B   Every, each and both

(75)   a.   <u>Every</u> student who knows **any** linguistics has applied to the department.
         b.   *Presupposition:* None.

- If *every* carries a presupposition, the following test should reveal it (local accommodation in the scope of a quantifier over times):

(76)   a.   Each year since 1990, every visiting student from France who spent a quarter in the department got his first job in the US.
         b.   No presupposition that there was at least one student from France in the department every year from 1990 on.

(77)   (*Context:* Exactly two students know some linguistics.)
         a.   *__***Both***__ students who know **any** linguistics have applied to the department.
         b.   *Presupposition:* There are exactly two students who know some linguistics.

(78)   a.   Each year since 1990, both visiting students from France who spent a quarter in the department got their first job in the US.

     b.   It is presupposed that there were exactly two students from France in the department every year from 1990 on. (*Local accommodation*)

(79)   (*Context:* There is at least one student who knows some linguistics.)

     a. ??__*Each*__ student who knows **any** linguistics has applied to the department.

     b. *Presupposition:* The set of students who knew some linguistics is non-empty.

(80)   a. Each year since 1990, each visiting student from France who spent a quarter in the department got his first job in the US.

     b. It is presupposed that there was at least one student from France in the department every year from 1990 on. (*Local accommodation*)

- The difference between *each* and *every* is not captured by von Fintel/Lahiri (*each* and *every* are SDE not SUE in their restrictors).

C   Summary of the data

NPIs:	Why/How	Know	Sing. Definite description	Both
Weak:	✓ (rhetorical)	✓	*	*
Strong:	*	*	*	*

NPIs:	Because	Too	Regret that...	Be surprised that...	Only
Weak:	*	*	✓	✓	✓
Strong:	*	*	*	*	*

NPIs:	It-Cleft	Again	Even	Aspectual verb
Weak:	✓	✓	✓	✓
Strong:	*	✓	✓	✓

Table 1: NPI-Licensing in the Scope of Presuppositional Items in English

NPIs:	Why/How	Know	Sing. Definite description	Both
Weak:	*	*	*	*
Strong:	*	*	*	*

NPIs:	Because	Too	Regret that...	Be surprised that...	Only
Weak:	*	*	✓	✓	✓
Strong:	*	*	*	*	*

NPIs:	It-Cleft	Again	Even	Aspectual verb
Weak:	✓	✓	✓	✓
Strong:	*	✓	✓	✓

Table 2: NPI-Licensing in the Scope of Presuppositional Items in French